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The affirmative action debate going on in America today is a
product of highly charged forces that have been building for many
years now. So charged has the debate become, in fact, especially as
we move into the 1996 election year, that it seems at times that reason
has no place at all at the table.' One can understand that: the
history of race relations in this country, after all, is not a pretty
picture; and other categories of people too have long had legitimate
complaints that only lately have come to be addressed. At the same
time, many others feel strongly that they are being asked to bear the
burden for old wrongs in which they played no part at all; and in that
they see rank injustice.'
The issues that surround this debate will be sorted out through
reason alone, of course. My aim in this brief Essay, in fact, is to do
just that kind of sorting-to criticize the current debate by taking a
dispassionate look at the issues it raises. My method will be analytical,
not empirical. I am interested primarily in the right and wrong of the
* Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute,
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1. See, e-g., Michael Barone, The New America: A New U.S. News Poll Shatters Old Assumptions
About American Politics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 10, 1995, at 18 (stating that African
Americans and Hispanics are divided on issue of affirmative action); Robert A.Jordan, Used to
Be Discrimination Was the Dirty Word, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1995, at B4 (explaining changing
political climate as it relates to affirmative action); Charles Krauthammer, Dodging and Weaving
on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at A25 (editorial) (noting changing affirmative
action policies under different administrations); Richard Lacao, A New Push for Blind Justice,
TIME, Feb. 29, 1995, at 39 (discussing Americans' growing suspicion toward affirmative action);
Frank B. Williams, Groups March forAffrnnativeAction, LA. TIMES, Mar. 24,1995, at B3 (discussing
multiple political positions on affirmative action issue).
2. See John M. Bunzel, Race Preferences Violate the American Promise of Equal Rights, Equal
Treatment Over Affirmative Action, S.F. ExAMiNER, Apr. 16, 1995, atA13 (highlighting"resentment
among whites" toward affirmative action policies); Armstrong Williams, Color-Coded Scholarships,
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matter, rather less in the question of what policies have or have not
produced what results. (Discussions of the latter kind often assume,
wrongly, that we are clear about the former.) In this, I will follow
reason where it leads, even if it should lead to conclusions that
challenge widely held beliefs. At this point I should say simply that
the conclusions I reach will likely disturb many, for the affirmative
action debate leads ineluctably to the deeper antidiscrimination
debate of which it is a part and hence to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(1964 Act)', which gave rise to questions that have yet to be resolved.
I. FIRST PRINCIPLES
We start with first principles, as in America we must. This nation
arose from a set of principles that are outlined in our founding
documents-the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, and the Civil War Amendments. And the theme that
runs through those documents, however much their principles may
have been ignored in practice, can be reduced to a single
idea-freedom. Not freedom from want or any of the modem affir-
mative entitlements that sometimes pass under the rubric of "free-
dom," but simple, uncomplicated freedom, as captured by the idea
that each of us has a right to be free from the interference of others,
free to plan and live his own life, restrained only by the equal right
of others to do the same.4 The goal of securing that right-whether
against slavery, or Jim Crow, or any other form of legal
oppression-has animated the civil rights movement from its
inception.'
But if freedom is our goal-indeed, is our right-and if govern-
ments are in fact instituted among men to secure their rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, then we cannot pick and choose
the freedoms we protect-to say nothing of those we prohibit-for
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)
(1994)).
4. I have examined many of the complex issues that surround the idea of freedom in
chapter one of my doctoral dissertation. See Roger Pilon, A Theory of Rights: Toward Limited
Government (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago); see also Maurice
Cranston, Human Rights: Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43-53
(D.D. Raphael ed., 1967) (demonstrating why moder view is wrong).
5. In the words of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution
and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which
every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men would be
guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Martin Luther KingJr., "I Have A Dream" Speech at Lincoln Memorial (Aug. 23, 1963), repinted
in LEND ME YOUR EARs 497 (William Safire ed., 1992).
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freedom is a seamless web. Freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
and freedom of association 6 are simply different forms of the basic
principle. Nor may we ask whether a religion is true or speech is
worthy before we protect it, for value judgments of that kind have no
place in a matter of principle. We may ask only whether rights of
others are implicated. If not, individuals or groups are free to do
whatever they wish. Government in a free society secures rights,
leaving it to individuals to pursue whatever values they wish within
that legal structure.
A. Freedom of Association
Why, then, should we treat freedom of association any differently?
Yet today we do-and have ever since the passage of the 1964 Act.
Freedom of association has two aspects. It entails the right of
individuals or groups to associate with others as against interference
by third parties. And it entails the right not to associate with others
except on terms that are mutually agreeable. Both aspects reduce to
the same thing-freedom from interference. In one case the
interference is from third parties. In the other, it is from would-be
associating parties. If freedom is the guiding principle, there could
hardly be a right to force oneself on others-whether as a third party
or as a potential associate-for such a right would amount to the
denial of freedom in the name of freedom. The freedom in
"freedom of association" is the freedom to be left alone, not the
"freedom" to force oneself on another.
In essence, freedom of association is no more complicated than
that. And we understand the principle in all manner of contexts.
What was slavery, after all, if not an extreme form of forced associa-
tion? Yet in abrogating the principle with the 1964 Act, we set in
motion an entirely predictable chain of events that has brought us to
where we are today, with reversed presumptions of innocence and
burdens of proof, mandated goals and timetables, endless classifica-
tions, and growing classification-based animosity. Given those results,
and the confusion that surrounds the debate today, it is worth
exploring how the 1964 Act and its progeny have brought that about.
6. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech.... or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble ... ").
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B. Sovereignty
To do so, we have to go to the root of the matter, by noticing that
the principle underlying freedom of association is one of sovereignty.
At the outset, each of us is sovereign over what is his-his life, liberty,
and property. Although it may be difficult at times to define the
boundaries of sovereignty in certain contexts-nuisance and risk, for
example-the principle is perfectly clear, and its application is
relatively clear in everything from interpersonal to international
contexts. The wrong in forced association is simply this: it takes
control from another, control that belongs by right to that other, thus
violating his sovereignty.
Slavery did that almost completely. But so did Jim Crow laws to a
lesser extent, by prohibiting people who wanted to associate from
doing so, thus abrogating their freedom of association by overriding
their sovereignty with respect to those associations. 7  "We, not you,
are going to regulate your associations," the state could be heard to
say. To the extent that the state said and did that, it controlled the
lives of its citizens, black and white alike. That the control was
brought about through majoritarian processes-where it was-was
neither here nor there to the principle of the matter, for rights of
association and personal sovereignty were violated by the tyranny of
the majority, a majority that had no such power under a properly
interpreted Constitution.8
7. Congressman McHenry, in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1875, stated: "If a
man sees proper to associate with negroes, to eat at the same table, ride on the same seat with
them in cars, or sees proper to send his children to the same schools with them, ... I would not
abridge his right to do so." Michael W. McConnell, The OniginalistJustificationforBrown: A Rep
to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1949 (1995).
8. The Fourteenth Amendment empowers the judiciary, in § 1, and Congress, in § 5, to
secure the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against state measures that
might abridge those guarantees. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. As the debates that
surrounded the writing and ratification of the amendment make clear-reinforced by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which was reenacted in 1870, one month after ratification of the amend-
ment-"privileges and immunities" included the very rights the Jim Crow laws denied. See, e.g.,
EARL M. MALrz, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-69, at 157-58 (1990)
(discussing that Fourteenth Amendment was originally thought to go beyond racial discrimina-
tion but still be limited by theory of limited absolute equality); RobertJ. Reinstein, Completing
the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendmen4 66 TEMP.
L. REv. 361 (1993) (discussing how Declaration of Independence's principles of equality were
not incorporated into Constitution but were added by 39th Congress via Fourteenth
Amendment); Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment 103
YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (concluding that Congressman John Bingham, author of Fourteenth
Amendment, intended to include Bill of Rights through Privileges or Immunities Clause). With
the Slaughter-House Cases, however, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was effectively lost. See
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-79 (1872) (distinguishing privileges and
immunities of citizens of United States from those of citizens of state and extending federal
protection only to former); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896) (Harlan,J.,
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In applying the principle of sovereignty, however, it is crucial to
distinguish the private and public sectors. Three conclusions then
follow. First, in the private sector, government may not interfere
when private parties wish. to associate; Jim Crow not only permitted
but required such interference. Second, neither may government
interfere when a private party wishes not to associate with another
private party; the 1964 Act prohibits such refusal, on certain
grounds,9 and thus interferes with the right not to associate. In both
cases-whether to prohibit a private association or to force
one-government interference overrides private sovereignty, thus
violating the right of the individual to control himself and his
associations. But if sovereignty is the principle of control over what
is one's own, we are all sovereigns of the public sector because we are
all owners of that sector. Thus, third, we must all be equally free to
associate with public officials and institutions, save for such restraints
as are necessary for those officials and institutions to function as they
were meant to function.
C. Discrimination
To recast these conclusions in the more common but less precise
idiom of discrimination, if private individuals and institutions are to
be free and sovereign, they have a perfect right to discriminate in
favor of or against other private individuals or institutions-for any
reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all. By contrast, public
officials and institutions may not discriminate except on grounds that
are narrowly tailored to serve the functions for which they were
elected, appointed, or created in the first place; for to permit
discrimination on other grounds would be to strip a portion of the
public of control over, use of, or opportunity with what are, after all,
their officials and institutions.
Clearly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its progeny are inconsistent
with all three implications of the principles of sovereignty and
freedom of association. To be sure, the 1964 Act abolished what
dissenting) (stating that majority's holding destroyed equality of rights); Clarence Thomas, The
Higher Law Background of the Pivileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmen 12 H-Iv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 66 (1989) (concluding that Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson is most
explorative and underappreciated exposition of Privileges or Immunities Clause). I have
discussed this issue more fully in Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On
Recovering Our Founding Pinciples, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 526-29 (1993), and in A
Government of Limited Powers, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS 17, 26-28 (1995).
9. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) [hereinafter
1964 Act]. Title VII of the 1964 Act prohibits private employment discrimination based on
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
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remained of Jim Crow, and not a moment too soon; for that alone,
it may have been worth the rest. 0 But the Act went on to prohibit
private discrimination on specified grounds, the list of which has ex-
panded over the years.' That amounts to a straightforward violation
of the right not to associate, as noted in point two above. Yet insofar
as numerical patterns of association must be preserved, as a practical
matter, to avoid litigation under the Act, the Act interferes with the
right to associate free from third-party interference, much asJim Crow
did, as noted in point one above. Finally, insofar as public sector
discrimination is rationalized under the 1964 Act and its proge-
ny-through affirmative action programs, for example-that too is a
straightforward violation of the rights of those who are discriminated
against by institutions that belong, in the end, to those people too.
Thus, point three above is implicated as well.
D. "Right" and "Wrong"
Starting from first principles, then, the picture of right and wrong
that emerges in the matter of discrimination is rather different than
the picture ordinarily implicit in the current affirmative action debate.
Whereas it is commonly assumed that there is no private right to
discriminate against others on certain-but only certain-grounds, it
turns out that that is not the case in a truly free society. If private
parties are to retain their sovereignty, they have a perfect right to
discriminate in favor of or against others-on any ground, "good" or
"bad," or no ground at all-and those others have no right to be
favored and no right not to be discriminated against-no right to
force themselves upon unwilling associates. Public parties, by
contrast, have no right to discriminate either in favor of or against
others except on grounds that narrowly serve the public function at
issue. And the same principle of sovereignty determines the outcome
in both domains.
But "right" and "wrong" are systematically ambiguous moral terms.
Sometimes they are used with reference to rights, other times with
10. Thus, Richard A. Epstein writes:
So great were the abuses of political power before 1964 that, knowing what I know
today, if given an all-or-nothing choir- I should still have voted in favor of the Civil Rights
Act in order to allow federal power to break the stranglehold of local government on
race relations.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 10 (1992) (emphasis added).
11. In addition to the grounds listed in the 1964 Act, see supra note 9. Congress has made
it unlawful to refuse to hire based on age or physical or mental handicap. SweAge Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); and American With Disabilities
Act of 1990, § 102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
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reference to values. As just used, for example, "fight" and "wrong"
characterize matters of strict moral principle, drawn from the theory
of rights. Thus, we may say that it is wrong to force people to
associate when they do not want to; we can say that because those
people have a right not to associate. In so speaking, "wrong" is a
function of the theory of rights, grounded on first principles of
private sovereignty and individual liberty. But we may also say that it
would be wrong for a person to discriminate (on certain grounds),
even though he has a right to do so. In that case, "wrong" is a
function of the values we bring to the matter. Others may disagree
with our judgment: presumably, the discriminating party does, at
least. There is no inconsistency, however, in saying that people have
a right to discriminate, but it is wrong to do so (again, on certain
grounds), for the moral terms at issue, as thus used, come from dif-
ferent domains of morality.12
For reasons of principle, and for practical reasons as well, we have
traditionally used law and legal force to secure our relatively objective
rights. Within that framework, we have used moral suasion to
encourage individuals to pursue values that, in our subjective
assessment, we have thought worthy of pursuit. That distinc-
tion-between rights legally secured and values morally encour-
aged-is at the heart of a free society: we respect differences among
individuals regarding values, even as we insist that rights be respected
by all. And we understand the distinction and its application in such
areas as speech and protest; for we have no difficulty at all, in most
cases, in defending the right of a reprehensible speaker, even as we
condemn his speech."3 We do have difficulty, however, in extending
the principle from speech to action generally, in appreciating that the
principle is perfectly generalizable-in defending the right to do
wrong, even as we condemn the wrong done. 4 The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is a case in point.
12. SeeH.LA. Hart, Are ThereAny NaturalRights?, 64 PHiL. REv. 175,186 (1955) (urging care
in use of moral language). For my own thoughts, see Roger Pilon, Ordering Rights Consistently:
Or What WeDo and Do Not Have Rights To, 13 GA. L. REv. 1171, 1193-96 (1979) (distinguishing
rights and values, and "ought" and "obligation").
13. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (upholding Ku Klux Klan's right
to burn crosses as form of speech while labeling such acts "reprehensible").
14. I have discussed this point more fully in ROGER PILON, F.AG-BURNING, DISCRIMINATION,
AND THE RIGHT TO Do WRONG: TWO DEBATES 1-7 (1990), reprinted in FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
HANDBOOK 233-38 (James L. Swanson ed., 1991).
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II. DEPARTING FROM PRINCIPLE
In 1964, Congress took it upon itself to end at last the forced racial
segregation that had characterized southern institutions, both public
and private, for almost a century. But it did not stop there. In that
year and in the years since, governments at all levels began enacting
measures that prohibited not only public but private individuals and
institutions as well from discriminating against others on a growing
range of grounds and in a wide array of activities.'5
As outlined above, the prohibition of public discrimination is not
only perfectly legitimate but morally required, save for the exceptions
there noted. The prohibition of private discrimination is another
matter. However offensive we may find it, however much we may
condemn it, private discrimination is a right entailed by the rights of
private sovereignty and freedom of association. Rather than leave the
problem of private discrimination to moral suasion, however,
Congress sought to remedy it through force of law. That effort-to
end through legal force what might have been minimized, over time,
through moral suasion-has had predictable results. And only a brief
reflection is needed to show why.
A. The Slide to Affirmative Action
Discrimination is a mental act. As we use the term today, it is not
the act of refusing to associate with someone (or the act of associating
with someone else) that constitutes "discrimination": for in itself, that
act is unobjectionable. Rather, it is the reason for which one refuses
to associate (or associates with someone else) that leads us to say that
he discriminated against (or in favor of) another. When the reason
is "irrational," we speak of discrimination. It is thus the mental
component of the act that brands that act "discrimination," for the
same act, done for a "rational" reason, would not be so branded.
In truth, of course, all acts are acts of discrimination, for to act is
to choose, and to choose is to discriminate, whatever the reason (s) for
choosing one way or another. Our normative use of "discriminate,"
however, places some reasons off-limits, reasons that have grown more
15. See supra notes 9 & 11. For current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
prohibitions in the workplace, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1994). For federal
prohibitions on discrimination outside the workplace, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994). I am
unaware of any comprehensive collection of the voluminous antidiscrimination statutes that have
been enacted by state and local governments, prohibiting discrimination on grounds ranging
from sexual orientation to family composition, covering activities ranging from housing to
insurance, credit, and much else.
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numerous over time. Yet to forbid discrimination on those grounds
raises any number of problems, both moral and practical, quite apart
from straightforwardly violating rights of sovereignty and association.
First, any choice about association ordinarily involves not one but
numerous, often complex reasons, reflecting a host of further
interests and considerations. To suppose, therefore, that such a
choice can be reduced and charged to a single, overriding reason is
to seriously mischaracterize the act at issue. In most cases, life is just
not that simple.
Second, whatever the context-employment, housing, lending,
insurance underwriting, academic admissions and athletics, to
mention only a few-the reasons that lead eventually to a decision
will often be irreducibly subjective, and in the end will be inescapably
subjective. Even such putatively objective standards as some of those
that are used in academic admissions, for example, presuppose
"merit" as a further or underlying rationale for choosing one
candidate over another. But merit is only one among several such
"ultimate" reasons that may be at play in a given decision. Thus, to
brand some reasons "rational" and others "irrational" is to suppose an
objectivity that is contextual or, in the end, is simply not there. For
that reason at least we have traditionally left it to private individuals
and institutions to make those decisions, to decide which associations
will serve their interests, since they, not the public, are the bestjudges
of those interests-and will pay the price if they judge wrongly. Many
will associate on the basis of merit-as they see it. Others may have
other reasons for associating, some of which conflict with mer-
it-again, as they see it. That is their business because, in the end,
they are sovereign with respect to such decisions.
Third, and most important for the affirmative action debate,
because discrimination is an inherently mental act, the attempt to pro-
hibit it raises practical problems that lead inescapably to the troubles
we have today, more than thirty years after the effort began. For
again, it is not the refusal to associate that is prohibited but the
refusal to associate on one of the forbidden grounds. Yet even
assuming that we can reduce a decision to a single ground, how do
we know that one of the forbidden grounds determined a given
decision? We are up against the problem of "other minds," which we
have understood since at least Descartes. Given the sanctions that
attach to violations of the various civil rights statutes, people are
simply not going to reveal their grounds for deciding as they do.
That means that any proof of discrimination must be by inference.
But unlike seemingly similar cases, such as most cases involving proof
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of criminal intent, there is no underlying wrong, no tortious act to aid
in the proof. Indeed, the underlying act is perfectly legitimate. It is
the intent alone that makes it wrong. How then do we show the
wrongful intent?
1. In the private sector
Recognizing early on that it would have very few enforcement
actions if it limited itself to provable cases of intentional discrimina-
tion, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set
about crafting guidelines for private-sector employment discrimina-
tion,"6 later approved by the Supreme Court, 7 that opened the
enforcement doors wide, even as problems poured through the
opening. In a nutshell, those rules enabled plaintiffs to make out a
prima facie case against an employer by showing that a selection
procedure the employer used-job tests, academic degree require-
ments, height-and-weight standards-had a "disparate impact" against
members of a class protected under the 1964 Act." Essentially,
demonstrating disparate impact amounted to showing that members
of a protected class were "underrepresented" in the employer's
workforce, which raised endless problems of interpretation regarding
the classes to be related-the class allegedly underrepresented and
the class of the employer's workforce from which the plaintiff was
allegedly excluded. But assuming that the plaintiff was able to satisfy
that initial burden-ordinarily quite easy to do-the burden then
shifted to the employer to show that he was not "discriminating," for
he might be hiding behind such "neutral" selection procedures,
letting them do the discriminating for him. 9 To carry out that
16. SeeUniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1978);
see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971) (quoting text of EEOC
guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures).
17. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 (granting administrative interpretation of EEOC guidelines
.great deference").
18. See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in the
Impact of a Modernist Statutory Preceden 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1353 (discussing Gnggs decision in
relation to similar disparate-impact cases); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451-52
(1982) (applying statutory language of 1964 Act to find discrimination where blacks passed
promotion test less frequently than whites, even though passing exam was necessary but not
sufficient for promotion); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977) (finding gender
discrimination in hiring of prison guards because of disparate impact of height-and-weight
requirements).
19. Although it is often argued, with substantial evidence from the record, that Congress
intended in 1964 to prohibit only intentional discrimination, and that the 1964 Act authorizes
the use of "'any professionally developed ability test'" that is not "'designed, intended, or used
to discriminate because of race,'" Grggs, 401 U.S. at 433 (quoting § 703(h) of Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (emphasis added by Court)), the word "used" lends itself to ambiguity. It can be read
to preclude tests that are used intentionally to discriminate (on a forbidden ground); or it can
be read to preclude tests that discriminate (on a forbidden ground) unintentionally, if those
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burden, to justify his selection procedures, the employer had to
demonstrate some "business necessity," which in practice was often
impossible or extremely costly (and still problematic, as with validity
studies for job-specific tests)20 or both. Faced with that situation,
and with the costs and uncertainty of potentially endless litigation,
most employers simply began "hiring by the numbers."2'
Thus, in the private sector, affirmative action did not have to be
explicitly mandated. If it was not implicit in the 1964 Act, it was
made so by enforcement procedures that left employers little real
choice but to undertake affirmative action in employment decisions.
Never mind that the idea of "underrepresentation" was not part of the
1964 Act, or that any number of factors besides discrimination might
explain such underrepresentation. Never mind that the EEOC
procedures amounted to shifting the burden of proof, to requiring
employers to prove their innocence. The fact remains that once we
decided in 1964 to prohibit what amounts to a mental act, we were
faced with a problem we have never squarely addressed: either we
would take something like the road we have taken, with all that that
has entailed; or we would have very few enforcement actions, thus
making a mockery of the Act and its noble aims.
Today, many conservatives are of the view that we should abolish-
indeed, prohibit-affirmative action in the private sector, but
continue to prohibit intentional discrimination there. Yet they are
silent with respect to the question of how we would enforce such
antidiscrimination measures short of something like the procedures
just outlined.22 In a free society, of course, employers would be
perfectly free to engage in voluntary affirmative action of any kind-
and would likely be encouraged to do so in certain circumstanc-
tests cannot be independently justified.
20. See, eg, Linda S. Gottfredson &James Sharf, eds., Fairness in Employment Testing, 33J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 225-40 (1988) (Spec. Issue).
21. In fact, during congressional hearings prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
several employers made it clear that they do, in fact, hire by the numbers, simply to avoid
litigation. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9537 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (discussing Wall StreetJournal
article noting lawyers' practice of advising clients to "hire by numbers" to avoid litigation); id.
at S15,318 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (recognizing fear that disparate
impact lawsuits would result in "quotas or hiring by the numbers"); id. at H4431 (daily ed.June
12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (acknowledging risk of encouraging quota or "hiring by the
numbers system").
22. See Clint Bolick, Questioning the Unquestionable, REASON, Aug./Sept. 1992, at 58, 60
(reviewing Richard Epstein's Forbidden Grounds (1992), but opposing Epstein's call for repeal of
laws prohibiting private discrimination, saying that "so long as the legacy of discrimination"
persists, prohibition of intentional discrimination is necessary); Nelson Lund, ReformingAffirma-
tive Action in Employment: How to Restore the Law of Equal Treatment, Heritage Foundation
Committee Brief No. 17 (Aug. 2,1995), at 13, 16, 17 (arguing that reducing discrimination does
not require preferential programs but only a color-blind law).
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es-for the discrimination that is entailed by affirmative action is
perfectly legitimate as a private act. Those who rest their case on
antidiscrimination, however, rather than on private sovereignty and
freedom of association, are precluded from such a result. They insist
on antidiscrimination, but have no way to stop the slide, as a practical
matter, toward effectively forced affirmative action. Their counter-
parts on the other side of the debate, by contrast, often have no
qualms about even mandated affirmative action-notwithstanding the
discrimination it entails and their premise of antidiscrimination.23
For them, discrimination in the name of antidiscrimination is
acceptable.24
2. In the public sector
In the public sector, the same slide toward affirmative action has
taken place, but here the issues are rather more complicated. Recall
that "irrational" discrimination must be prohibited in the public
sector-on the same principles of sovereignty and freedom of asso-
ciation that apply to permit discrimination, rational or not, in the
private sector. Yet "irrational," in the end, remains as irreducibly
subjective here as in its private-sector application. Essentially, the idea
is to select means-to make decisions about association-that are
"reasonably" suited to serve the ends for which public institutions are
established in the first place, but to do so in light of the principle that
all members of the sovereign public have equal rights to participate
in their institutions. Thus, to take an easy case, a public fire
department may not discriminate against black applicants for the
position of firefighter, but may discriminate against certain handi-
capped applicants, who presumably would not be suited to the func-
tion.
Doubtless, some would object to the conclusions in that "easy"
case-on either or both counts, race and/or handicap. We can
respond in turn that such people are being "unreasonable," but the
means-ends call, in the final analysis, is not a matter of logical deduc-
tion, even in an easy case such as that. That is what it means to say
that such calls are, in the end, irreducibly subjective.
23. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCIMINATION 12-49
(1983) (arguing that law should not be color-blind but should use racially conscious criteria);
Terrance Sandalow, RacialPreferencea in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 685-86 (1975)
(advocating affirmative action as means of achieving diversity).
24. "[fln order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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What we are faced with, then, is a classic problem, pitting the
democratic principle against the equal-rights principle. On one hand,
we could turn over such decisions to democratic processes, thereby
inviting the tyranny of the majority. On the other hand, we could
insist upon the equal right of everyone to control what is, after all, his
institution, inviting the stalemate that results from the monopoly
holdout. Neither result is acceptable. Both could be avoided, be it
noted, by leaving firefighting and most other human undertakings to
the private sector. But if there is going to be a public sector at
all-and there surely is, even if the present effort to reduce the size
and scope of that sector continues-a solution must be found.
That solution would be second-best, of course, involving some
balance between legislatures exercising majoritarian will and courts
securing equal protection-second-guessing the political branches
with respect to whether any given decision was "rational." If courts
did their job, majoritarian capture of public institutions would be
checked. On the other hand, "irrational" checks by the weakest
branch would be subject to public obloquy and, eventually, to the
corrections of the appointments process.
But if it is the job of the judicial branch to check the political
branches from discriminating, do not the same practical enforcement
problems arise as arise in the private sector-leading to de facto
affirmative action? And if so, does not that affirmative action entail
the very discrimination that public institutions are forbidden to
engage in?
Setting aside affirmative action for the moment, checking public-
sector discrimination does indeed take us down the same road-with
all of its practical enforcement problems-yet the measures that mark
that road are inevitable if public-sector discrimination is to be
minimized. In particular, here the numbers are rightly probative.
And here public officials are rightly called to account if those
numbers suggest discrimination. But the numbers cannot be
dispositive, for again, any number of factors-in addition to the
forbidden intentional discrimination-could explain why a given
public workforce, say, or set of public contractors does not "look like
America." "Business necessity" may operate somewhat differently in
the public than in the private sector; but here at least there is warrant
for second-guessing, for having one branch check another. It is for
the protection of the owners-in their collective and their individual
capacities.
But intentional discrimination is a tricky issue. Does the use, for
example, of otherwise neutral selection procedures that are known to
787
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:775
discriminate constitute intentional discrimination? Standardized
college admissions tests are well known for discriminating against
members of protected classes even as they discriminate in favor of
those who are likely to remain in college and be successful there."
What is a public college to do? Admit by "merit"? Temper that
standard with some "representational" considerations? Or take some
other course of action? Whatever its course, it will be discriminating.
The only difference will be in the criteria for discrimination.
To continue, may the public, by majority vote, select one criteri-
on-say, merit-to the exclusion of all others? Are judges required
to sustain that decision against equal-protection challenges from
members of a discriminated-against class-who own that college too,
after all? If not, is the judge permitted to devise a "neutral" or
"nondiscriminatory" purpose for the college and a set of comple-
mentary standards for admission-in the name of equal protection?
Or must he simply send the case back until the public gets it right,
until it develops criteria for admission that treat all equally? Would
that lead to something like "open-admissions" (or even assured
graduation)? Would fully applying the equality principle-a principle
that is perfectly justifiable in itself-render such institutions as public
higher education utterly pointless? And is there not a lesson in
that-not about applying the equality principle but about undertaking
projects such as higher education through the public sector in the
first place?
In truth, as a matter of first principles, no clear answers to those
questions exist. For once we embark on some public project, equal
protection must follow as a matter of right. It is one thing to explain
to a handicapped applicant that we are all better off, including the
applicant, if he is not permitted to become a public firefighter, quite
another to explain to a rejected public college applicant that we are
all better off, including that applicant, if he is not admitted to the
college. He might rightly respond that he, unlike the handicapped
firefighter applicant, is getting no direct benefit from the institution
he is forced to support, but is excluded from, whereas others are
benefited. And to that, there is no answer.
25. Cf John Hildebrand, SAT Scores Rise But Still Lag the 1960s, NEWSDAY, Aug. 19, 1993, at
7 (noting "large gap" in test scores between blacks and whites); Erin McCormick, SATs Biased
Against Women Study Finds, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 21, 1995, at A8 (reporting study finding that 200
to 300 more qualified women would be admitted to University of California at Berkeley annually
if SAT gender bias were corrected); Elizabeth Shogren, Testing Called Unfair Merit Scholars Favor
Boys Group Claims, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 27,1993, at iC (reporting claims that National
Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test is biased toward males).
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But to return to the problem of checking "irrational" public-sector
discrimination, even in the clear case involving proven discrimina-
tion-the all-white fire department in the mixed-race area, for
example-by no means does it follow that affirmative action is the
right remedy. Assuming, that is, that an individual plaintiff has
demonstrated that he was discriminated against on an irrational basis,
that victim is entitled to be made whole-through injunctive relief,
damages, or whatever else it may take in a given case. Affirmative
action, however, is not an individualized remedy like that-aimed at
making an individual victim whole-but a "social remedy." As such,
it suffers from all the problems that any other socialized scheme
suffers from-most especially, the subjugation of individuals and their
rights in favor of a class-based scheme. It is one thing to right a
wrong by requiring the wrongdoer to make his victim whole-that
keeps the parties related by the wrong, related by the remedy-quite
another to right a wrong by ordering the wrongdoer to discriminate
in favor of non-victims and against non-wrongdoers, which is what
affirmative action amounts to as it seeks to bring about "social justice."
A form of justice that operates only by creating new victims-only
through injustice-can hardly claim the name 'Justice."
But if affirmative action as a remedy is fraught with problems of
injustice, at least it purports to be a remedy to a wrong, not an
outright scheme of social engineering, unattached to any prior wrong.
Not so the form of affirmative action that aims unabashedly at
distributing people in positions according to their proportions in
society. Call it "representational affirmative action," call it making
institutions "look like America,"2" call it what you will, it amounts to
nothing but rank discrimination in service of someone's or some
group's social vision. As a private matter, again, such an effort is
perfectly legitimate-and may even be commendable in certain
situations. But public institutions may not discriminate, except on
functional grounds, even to overcome past patterns of discrimination.
If that is so, they surely may not discriminate merely to bring about
some preferred pattern of the moment.
26. For example, there is a recent controversy over a Montgomery County, Maryland school
district's refusal to admit two kindergarten children into a French immersion program because
their transfer from their neighborhood school into the new school would upset the ethnic
balance at their neighborhood school. The school board's justification for denial was based on
the fact that the two students were Asian and the school they were leaving was "deficient" in
Asians. See Dan Beyers, School Board Backs Denial of Transfers: Two Montgomery Families Challenge
Race Policy, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1995, at B1; Montgomery Schools to Rethink Desegregation, Transfer
Policies, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at Dl.
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B. Returning to Pinciple
There can be no question that discrimination is and has long been
a problem in America. We are not alone in this, of course, for all
nations experience the problem in one form or another-especially
heterogeneous nations-and many have a much worse record on the
subject than we.
But if discrimination is a fact of the human condition, by no means
does it follow that the only remedy is through the force of law. In
fact, once we recognize that discrimination is indeed a product of the
mind (and heart), we should acknowledge that only moral suasion will
address that condition. Does anyone seriously believe that if
prohibitions on private-sector discrimination were ended tomorrow,
we would see rampant discrimination in that sector, or that private
action-from public ridicule to boycotts-would not immediately arise
to isolate and marginalize those who engaged in irrational discrimina-
tion? We all know that such discrimination is wrong, even if done by
right. We disagree only on how to address it.
The road we have taken to address the problem has put govern-
ment in a business it should never have been in, has created a legal
industry that should never have been created, and has spawned a
classification consciousness that should never have been spawned. Far
from solving the very real wounds of our history, our approach has
only created animosity among the very fair-minded people who should
be expected to lead the moral drive against discrimination. We are
indeed falling into warring camps, of several complexions, which is
exactly what we should expect when we ask government to do what it
should never have been asked to do in the first place. We will end
that war only when we return to principle, only when we do for
ourselves what we should have done for ourselves from the start, only
when we truly open the doors to freedom.
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